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I. THE ARGUMENT
Japanese industry and government have targeted aerospace as one of
three "key technologies" (kiban gijutsu) for the twenty-first century. In
its famous 1970 Vision, MITI elevated aerospace as the equal of nuclear
power and the information industry, a status reaffirmed in 1980. Coveted
for its technological linkages with a wide range of high value-added
industries and its potential to lift prominent firms out of declining
sectors, aerospace enjoys considerable public support. By the early 1980's,
formal government subsidies for commercial jet engine development were
nearly equal to those for computer research and greater than those for
telecommunications, energy, and "next generation base technologies."l By
the late 1980's, MITI had supported a decade of commercial collaboration
with leading Western aerospace firms. Some scholars and the press have
suggested that this support, like that for steel, machinery, and electronics
before it, will transform commercial aerospace into the next Japanese export
success. Others are more pessimistic.2
But we believe that this debate misses a critical point, for the
aerospace industry is unlike any other in one very important respect: it has
been created and sustained by the military and its derivative air and space
programs, not by commercial markets for civilian products. Commercial
aviation is a large and expanding business, but it has played a minor role
* This essay is forthcoming as a chapter in Chalmers Johnson, Laura
Tyson, and John Zysman, eds. Politics and Productivity: How Governments
Create Advantage in World Markets. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Books, 1988.
The authors would like to acknowledge the thoughtful critiques of an earlier
draft of this paper provided by: Michael Chinworth, Ellen Frost, Tom Gros,
David Mowery, Paul Rubin, Gregg Rubinstein, and Bud Shank. The remaining
mistakes are, of course, our own.
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in the development of the manufacturing enterprise that enables it.
Accordingly, we argue that an analytic focus restricted to commercial
aviation overlooks essential characteristics of the aerospace industrial
development process. In Japan as elsewhere, military production will
predominate for the foreseeable future.
The military side of Japan's aerospace sector also merits attention for
another reason. The global transformation of the industry's primary
activities -- from bending metal to integrating advanced materials,
microelectronics, computers, telecommunications and high technology in
general -- has converged with growing Japanese strength in these fields, and
with long-developed strengths in small-lot precision manufacturing and
quality control. Domestic and overseas military markets now present major
opportunities for Japanese firms to profit from the extended application of
technologies originally developed for commercial purposes. Such
opportunities for "dual-use" are especially prevalent in electronics, but
exist for a broad spectrum of manufacturing industries. The Japanese call
this technology transfer "spin-on," emphasizing the difference from the
experience elsewhere, in which technology has historically "spun-off" from
military to civilian applications. Commercial technology is now vital to
all Western military aerospace industries. The US Department of Defense and
MITI have both expressed an intense interest in the technology base of the
Japanese commercial electronics and materials industries.
Japan's military aerospace industry arms the nation, serves as the
bellwether for commercial aerospace and provides an important new market for
the application of civilian high technology. For these reasons, among
others to be explored below, Japan's military aerospace sector is growing in
size and importance. As it grows, Japan must juggle the conflicting
imperatives of commercial opportunity, international relations, and the
legacy of demilitarization. In this paper, we explore the evolving linkages
between military production, industrial development, and Japanese strategies
in aerospace.
II. THE BACKGROUND
Aerospace emerged from a WWII alliance among the military, the
scientific community, and the aviation, electronics, and instrumentation
industries. Airliners and space programs have attracted more attention in
the intervening decades, but military production remains the core activity.
Commercial production is secondary and rests firmly on a military-industrial
infrastructure. American aerospace, by far the world's largest, most
diversified and commercialized national industry, typically sells over 60%
of output to the Department of Defense and a significant fraction of the
remainder to other government agencies and foreign military establishments.
The Japan Defense Agency procures over 80% of Japanese output, in a market
where the largest domestic producer of jet engines has never sold one for
commercial use. Military production dominates the European aircraft
industry despite the Airbus project. Over the last twenty years, military
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aircraft production has overwhelmed civilian production worldwide by a
margin greater than two to one. Only five of twenty-uwo aircraft
manufacturers have survived in postwar commercial markets, and only one does
more business with the airlines than with the armed forces. Both foreign
experience and Japan's own industrial development suggest that Japan cannot
afford to nurture commercial aerospace apart from military production.
It could have been otherwise had Japan's planners succeeded, for they
have tried repeatedly to participate in the postwar commercial aircraft
business. The first major effort attempted to establish an independent
presence via design and production of the YS-11, Japan's first and thus far
only indigenous commercial aircraft. Government and industry initiated the
YS-11 project in 1957 with the creation of the Nippon Aircraft Manufacturing
Company, a "national policy company" (kokusaku gaisha).4 This project
engaged all of Japan's heavy industrial and related components manufacturers
in a consortium in which the state assumed 50% of the equity and guaranteed
full subsidization of development costs. By most accounts, this formula
also guaranteed that there was little incentive for market analysis or cost
reduction. While acclaimed as a technological success, fewer than 200
planes were sold, two-thirds to domestic airlines which would have bought
more had it not been for severe production delays. The program ultimately
suffered losses four times its capitalization and when it wound down in the
early 1970's, the planners retreated from their independent approach to
consider less ambitious strategies for commercial aviation.
By 1980 government and industry had swapped indigenous development for
international collaboration and allied themselves strategically with the
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company and with the International Aero Engines
Consortium led by Rolls-Royce and Pratt and Whitney.5 But despite a
successful and historically unprecedented junior partnership in the
development and production of Boeing's 767, the collaborative strategy is
succeeding slowly, at best. Even measured in devalued dollars, the Japanese
commercial aircraft business remains about one-fortieth the size of its
American counterpart, and accounts for merely .04% of Japanese manufacturing
value. Indeed, after a decade of subsidized cooperation, the total value of
Japanese commercial aircraft production remains less than 2% of the sales of
Toyota Motors. Nor has international cooperation been profitable. Slow
sales of the 767 have forced Japanese firms to produce at one-third the
planned rate and spread tooling costs over far fewer units than anticipated.
The high yen and dollar-denominated contracts have forced them to supply
parts -- for Boeing's 747 as well as for the 767 -- at a loss.6 To make
matters worse, the crown jewel of collaboration was snatched away in late
1987 when Boeing dramatically cut back the follow-on for the 767, the 7J7
co-development project. The 7J7 (the letter "J" standing for Japan) was the
largest and most promising component of the collaborative strategy; its
effective cancellation after years of planning has reopened debate over
appropriate strategies for the Japanese commercial airframe business.
Similarly, problems at the IAE consortium do not bode well for Japanese
engine manufacturers. The consortium's slow-selling V2500 engine repeatedly
failed development tests and resumed progress towards government
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certification only after the temporary substitution of old technology in a
key subsystem from Rolls Royce. IAE will need to recertify the V2500 when
the production model is ready, and will deliver engines late and below
specification. In 1987, IAE angered an important customer and lost
credibility throughout the industry when it announced the "Superfan" V2500
derivative, committed to an ambitious development schedule, and then
cancelled the project within four months, stating that the Superfan had
never been a definite product. The airline eventually cancelled its V2500
orders altogether, and another followed suit. IAE is resolving slowly the
technical problems, but costly delays, combined with tough competition and
the organizational awkwardness of a five-nation consortium with two leaders,
have made future profits improbable and the future of IAE itself
problematic. At best, the V2500 will be runner-up in a market segment led
by the GE/SNECMA consortium and is unlikely to recover development costs.
At worst, the leaders will tire of IAE's problems and pursue alternate
strategies to maintain their status as full-line producers, a real if
apparently diminishing possibility. In any case, the Japanese participants
long ago delivered their relatively low technology subsystems, and with
major events beyond their control, are learning what they can about
international sales and support. 7 They are also learning the hard way about
the vulnerabilities associated with junior partnerships in international
consortia.
Between the troubles at IAE and the demise of the 7J7, the
collaborative strategy once intended to drive commercial aerospace into the
next century is beginning to appear little more satisfactory than the
autonomous approach of the YS-11 era. Once again, and despite persistence
and flexibility, Japanese policy makers and industrialists have proved
unable to replicate in commercial aviation their success in other
industries. Is this failure inevitable, overdetermined by a long list of
adverse market conditions that MITI cannot surmount, and that MITI's
policies often exacerbate? Such conditions discussed in the literature
include a small and possibly misshapen home market, a lack of domestic
competition, the strong position of Western technology suppliers,
overdependence on low-growth military co-production, a ban on weapons
exports, a lack of experience with design, systems integration, and
international sales and support, and other factors. 8 The pernicious effects
of many of these problems can be seen in the examples above.
We agree that Japan's aerospace industry faces fundamental problems.
But we also believe that these problems -- and their solutions -- are less
determined by market forces per se than by political forces flowing from
Japanese attitudes about how and how much to best provide for national
security. Traditional reluctance to invest in the defense industry and a
ban on military exports surely have stunted the development of Japanese
aerospace. Most analyses acknowledge this and stop there, suggesting that
these political limitations place a "natural cap" on the industry; Mowery
and Rosenberg, for example, argue that "any growth in the aircraft market
must perforce come from an expansion of the commercial aircraft market."9
To the contrary, we believe that the Japanese perceive the benefits of this
business to be so compelling, and that these perceptions are converging so
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rapidly with other strategic and technological developments, that a
significant recalculation of Japanese defense industrial policy is not only
far more probable than permanent weakness in aerospace, but indeed, it is
already underway.
III. A NEW STRATEGY FOR JAPANESE AEROSPACE
The weakness of Japanese aerospace is best understood as the obverse of
the general economic benefits conferred by postwar demilitarization. By the
end of the Pacific War, the military had come to play a major role in
Japan's heavy industrial development, consuming a large fraction of domestic
output and presiding over a large and technically advanced aircraft
sector.1 0 Under Occupation orders, the military and its budget vanished and
the aircraft industry disappeared for seven crucial years while the West
entered the jet age. Despite nominal rearmament starting in 1954, the
military has played a trivial role in the postwar Japanese economy.
Demilitarization, imposed by the Occupation and later enabled by US security
guarantees, became the centerpiece of postwar security policy. A popular
anti-militarist political consensus, enshrined in the ambiguous Article Nine
of the Constitution, combined with exceptional opportunities in world
markets for commercial goods, made possible a temporary limit on spending
for "self-defense" forces of one percent of GNP (1976-1987). Military
procurement has been carefully supervised by MITI, and the industry that
equips them is formally forbidden to export. 11 These restrictions
undoubtedly contributed to commercial competitiveness overall, but
undermined Japan's efforts to compete in aerospace. This trade-off was
quite a happy one for most of the postwar period; the formal budget limit in
effect between 1976 and 1987 had been a reality since the mid 1960's, and
the export ban went unchallenged while heavy industry prospered in
commercial markets.
In the 1980's, however, a realignment of political and economic forces
has brought a recalculation of defense policy, which in turn has stimulated
a fundamental change in Japan's overall approach to aerospace industrial
development and in the scale and scope of the industry itself. The defense
budget and the fraction spent on aerospace have grown steadily over the past
decade, a period of austerity for other government agencies. The ban on
weapons transfers, always open to interpretation, is eroding as an obstacle
to the export of "dual use" aircraft and aerospace technology. Military
aerospace, including expanded production at the major electronics firms, is
fast becoming the primary beneficiary of an evolving Japanese national
security regime. In turn, this regime benefits from a gold mine of domestic
high technology, originally developed for civilian purposes but now
available to supplement and gradually supplant the imported results of
American military R&D.
Aerospace industry sales measured in yen have more than doubled and
become increasingly important to the diversified companies that participate
and increasingly attractive to those that do not. At industry-leader
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Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), aerospace sales grew by 50% between 1983
and 1985 alone, catapulting the business from last to second among seven
divisions.1 2 Aerospace and defence production have undergone similarly
vertiginous growth at other heavy industrial firms, such as Ishikawajima-
Harima Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries. Technological
competence, managerial experience, and facilities for research, development
and manufacturing have all improved substantially. A minor portion of the
growth in sales and capability has been funded by commercial projects and
somewhat more by the ambitious Japanese space program, but the lion's share
has come from a defense buildup that has already spanned several
administrations and that will continue at least into the 1990s. The one
percent of GNP limit ended with the fiscal 1988 budget, but its demise was
preordained by programs begun in the late 1970's and its importance had
diminished regardless. Japan's emergence as an economic giant means that 1%
of GNP now supports a defense budget comparable to that of West Germany or
France, each spending three times as much when expressed as a percentage of
GNP. Japan now ranks second in military spending among non-nuclear powers.
The shift towards aerospace industrial development via increased
defense production is best seen as part of a larger, nascent Japanese
industrial policy and national security strategy stimulated in large part by
declining American hegemony and the realignment of power in the
international political economy. Necessary preconditions were established
in the 1970s, when expensive oil, slow growth, and increased competition
from newly industrializing countries sparked wide-spread agreement within
the industrial and economic policy bureaucracies and the private sector that
a strong presence in high-technology industries was essential to Japan's
future economic success. Government and industry launched major efforts in
computers, materials science, semiconductors, mechatronics, and other high
value-added fields, many of which would later contribute to "spun-on"
competitiveness in aerospace even when more direct strategies proved
disappointing. At the same time, the US retreat from Southeast Asia, the
growth of Soviet power throughout the region, Japan's emerging economic
strength and, most of all, US exhortations, converged to create compelling
reasons for a Japanese military buildup. Economic pressure from the NIC's,
political pressure from the US, and military pressure from the Soviet Union
have only intensified in the years since.
It must be noted that whatever the extent of external pressures,
legitimate defense needs or available technology, considerable antipathy
towards the military remains firmly embedded in Japanese society. The
pacifist legacy of the Pacific War has led to a curious situation for
defense planners. Former Prime Minister Nakasone's previous service as
Director-General of the Defense Agency notwithstanding, there is no evidence
that the military have regained either sufficient political influence to
bring about such a change in policy, or sufficient political respectability
to be given a larger share of scarce public funds, financed with deficits,
to spend as they see fit. Although the situation has begun to change as
career officials assume key JDA posts, many are still held by officials
seconded from other ministries, especially MITI. 13 In a sense, though, this
change is irrelevant, for one of the most interesting and unusual aspects of

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the buildup is that it could not have been started or sustained without
MITI's firm support.
MITI officials have always been aware of the link between military and
commercial aerospace, and the depth of their previous commitment to an
exclusively civilian strategy can be overstated; as the name of the Aircraft
and Ordnance Bureau implies, they oversee the military production that
dominates the industry. As a result of such longstanding involvement and
the bleak near-term outlook for commercial projects in the late 1970's, MITI
endorsed stepped-up military production as a more timely, controllable and
realistic means of aerospace industrial development, as well as a fruitful
way to help the electronics industry move from consumer to capital goods. 14
MITI officials have steadily supported the defense buildup and worked
closely with the Japan Defense Agency and the private firms to insure that
the defense budget is advancing strategic industrial goals as well as
strategic military ones. We expect, moreover, that the latest disarray in
commercial strategy stemming from the demise of the 7J7 and the problems at
IAE will renew the relative importance of military efforts in MITI's policy
portfolio.
MITI's involvement in the growth of the military aerospace industry has
created a novel situation, for it has been standard historical practice for
nations to foster civilian industrial development in pursuit of military
advantage, not the other way around. We do not argue that the defense
buildup is somehow a Trojan horse for commercial strategy, although it is
clear that some civilian leaders support it for this reason. Nor do we
believe that Japanese planners have replaced their goal of building a
competitive commercial aerospace industry with that of creating a military
industrial complex; as noted above, plans are already being made for a new
Japanese-led transport consortium to fill the void left by the 7J7, a next-
generation transport engine is under development, and commercial aspirations
remain very much alive. 5 Finally, we do not believe that Japanese planners
are expecting military R&D to spin-off commercial technology as it did in
the US thirty years ago; they are convinced that far more technology will be
spun-on than off.1 6 We do expect, however, that with increased defense
procurement, and ultimately with overseas sales, Japan will fund the
military-industrial infrastructure that has been an historical precondition
for success in commercial aerospace, an infrastructure that today is built
upon dual-use technologies, already a Japanese strength. For the first
time, Japan is preparing to pursue "spin-off" and "spinr-on" simultaneously.
This first was suggested openly in an influential report to the
Minister for International Trade and Industry in mid-1988. After
establishing that Japan is a peaceful country that will continue to adhere
strictly to its three principles on weapons exports, this report clearly
addresses the rationale for participation in dual-use technology transfer
and joint weapons development with the US:
"...although patterns of technology diffusion related to
dual-use technologies are changing, one can see that
there are not a few cases of the effective diffusion of
__ ^ _·I___ I  UI
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"key technologies" from military to civilian sectors.
In order not to lag behind the West in international
competitiveness in the future, it is undoubtedly
necessary to participate as appropriate in themilitary
sector through close contact with top rank Western
firms. Most advanced technologies are already dual-
,,17use...
The report then continues by noting how sensitive a matter such an advance
into the defense industry is for Japan.
However sensitive, increased defense production is proving to be a
versatile and effective strategy for both industrial development and
national security. It satisfies multiple needs and interests, and has
become the basis for a new and active domestic political coalition, a
coalition that joins influential subgroups in the industrial, foreign, and
economic policy bureaucracies and the defense establishment with an
increasing number of important private firms. After identifying the
industrial base of this coalition, in the next section, we will explore its
actions in the specific case of Japan's single largest procurement program
of the 1990's, the FS-X next generation fighter plane.
IV. THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The four heavy industrial companies that dominate the Japanese
aerospace industry have been strong proponents of increased defense
production. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Kawasaki Heavy Industries
(KHI), Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI), and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries
(IHI) were all central participants in the first stages of economic
recovery, manufacturing ships, cars, electrical equipment, and other capital
goods that led Japan's industrialization through the 1960's. They were then
big losers from the first oil shock and the end of high growth. Along with
textile and steel firms, they were also among the first to be threatened by
producers in the NIC's. By the mid 1970s they clearly needed new business,
and for historical and economic reasons they looked quite naturally to
aerospace. At the time, however, commercial opportunities were actually
contracting as YS-11 production wound down without a follow-on. The firms
and their many stakeholders developed a strong interest in increased defense
production, and raised their collective voices in support. The influential
Federation of Economic Organizations, Keidanren, began insisting through its
Defense Industries Production Committee that the JDA do more for the
domestic defense industry.1 8
The military aircraft business is by no means new to these four firms.
They have engaged in different parts of the business together and separately
since its national introduction in the early part of the century. In the
prewar period all airplane manufacturing was done by single firms, there was
little or no standardization of parts or specifications, and productivity
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was low. A wartime consolidation ordered by the military was incomplete,
handicapped by opposition from the firms. As late as 1944 there were twelve
independent airframe producers and seven engine manufacturers. The US
Occupation then banned all aircraft manufacturing and broke up the major
manufacturers into smaller, more benign enterprises.l 9 The result was a
dispersion of engineering talent and the refocusing of manufacturing
activities. When the ban was lifted in 1952, the rest of the world was
already in the jet age, while the thinning ranks of Japanese aircraft
engineers had been designing bicycles and fire extinguishers.
The industry was revived first by repair and maintenance, then by off-
shore procurement, and later by co-production agreements with the American
military, and has never overcome its financial dependence on military
production.2 0 The handful of commercial projects, including the YS-11 and
components for Boeing, have been produced alongside warplanes and military
engines in plants surviving from the prewar era, often with machine tools
and other equipment paid for by the Japan Defense Agency.2 1 The
technological spillovers from military licensing also have been
considerable.2 2 According to Hall and Johnson:
"...In a very short period - largely as a result of
skillful importation of technology - the Japanese
acquired a small but capable and profitable aerospace
industry. A key element in this accomplishment was the
Japanese government's sponsorship of military aircraft
co-production programs." 23
Aircraft production is organized as divisions of the heavy industrial
companies and until recently provided only a small portion of their total
revenue. Despite Hall and Johnson's optimistic assessment, in the 1950's
and 1960's these divisions were less profitable than Japanese firms overall,
than other manufacturing firms, and than other divisions within the firms,
and were viewed internally as "poor cousins." In the 1970's, the business
collapsed. In the 1980's, however, it has been revived once again by
military production, and the prospect of sustained higher defense spending
and increased emphasis on domestic technology have turned the business into
an important and prestigious growth sector, offsetting precipitous declines
in such areas as shipbuilding and petrochemical plant construction. Defense
production has provided an almost "natural" path for the migration of human
and capital resources; the transition from sophisticated heavy machinery to
military aircraft is not seamless, but it is quite straightforward compared
with the steel firms' moves into silicon wafers and theme parks.2 4
The heavy industrial firms making airframes and engines are the biggest
but not the only players in the Japanese aerospace industry, nor are they
the only beneficiaries of the buildup. Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, NEC
and Hitachi produce avionics, missiles and military communication systems,
all prime areas for "spin-on" and all of which have boomed. There are also
many smaller component firms, and although most of their increasing output
goes to the JDA as well, they have enjoyed brisk growth in overseas
commercial sales since the mid-1980's. Overall, the industry is comprised
___1_11__11_111___1______-j/·i·
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of nearly two hundred firms, three-quarters of which are members of the
Society of Japanese Aerospace Industries (SJAC), the major industry
association.2
V. MAKING MILITARY AIRCRAFT
V.1. Product and Process
Modern jet fighters are remarkably complex, high performance machines.
The largest weigh up to 20 tons empty and the most powerful carry more than
their own weight in fuel and armament. They travel at altitudes ranging
from 100 feet to 10 miles at speeds exceeding 1500 miles per hour, and
execute maneuvers that will black out the pilot before reaching the limits
of the airframe. Their avionics meld together a bewildering array of
electronic, electro-mechanical and opto-electronic equipment that must
function in an environment of extreme temperature, shock vibration,
g-forces, and in the worst-case, electromagnetic pulse.26 Although many
nations now produce low performance tactical aircraft, those with the
technological, managerial and financial wherewithal to design and deploy
top-of-the-line fighters form an exclusive club, and they pay dearly for
membership. Until the shift in exchange rates in the mid-1980's, the amount
typically spent by the US simply for fighter-related R&D exceeded the sales
of the entire Japanese aerospace industry.
The design and manufacturing processes for these sophisticated machines
are equally complex and demanding. Like all aerospace final products,
fighters require long lead times and high R&D expenditures, both absolute
and relative to manufacturing costs. Each is an intricate assembly of
subsystems -- structure, propulsion, avionics, and armaments -- and each
subsystem in turn is an intricate assembly of components, many of which push
the limits of whatever technologies are involved. The low-rate
manufacturing process is both capital and labor intensive, and depends on
elaborate facilities, highly skilled artisans and slow learning curves.
Figure 1 illustrates the value-added chain, in which millions of parts are
designed, manufactured and built up into final products. The multi-year
multi-billion dollar process is essentially the same for all aerospace
vehicles, although some lack life-support and/or armaments.
Figure One about here: Aerospace Value-Added Chain
Aerospace systems integration deserves special mention. Systems
integration is not only, as pictured, one of the last links in the value
chain where all subsystems and components must be made to fit and work
together, but is also a metaphor for the management process in its entirety.
One cannot easily integrate subsystems at the tail end if the interface was
not properly specified up front or if inevitable in-process design changes
have not been properly managed. Integration problems are magnified by
concurrent development and production, multiple organizational boundaries,
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sheer complexity, and the need to insulate the overall program from delays
and difficulties at the subsystem level. With its blend of stiff technical
and managerial requirements, systems integration is the most challenging
aspect of aerospace production, and given the infrequency of full scale
production programs, also the hardest set of skills to develop. A stable
set of partners is a critical requirement.
V.2. Industrial Organization
The intricate value-added chain is reflected in an industrial division
of labor that varies from country to country. In the US, the traditional
structure has been a distinct pyramid with a dozen or so large "prime
contracting" firms competing at the top, mostly corporate combinations of
the original aircraft makers. With few exceptions, these firms specialize
in aerospace production and their fortunes rise and fall accordingly. In a
typical program, the winning prime contractor will do system R&D,
manufacture most of the main structures, and perform final assembly,
integration, and testing; the remaining 40%-70% by value is subcontracted
directly or as "government furnished equipment." Contracts for the major
subsystems are shared among other primes and a larger number of subsystem
manufacturers, which in turn let out work to thousands of small component
fabricators and machine shops. The general structure of European aerospace
is quite similar, although intra-European consortia generally assume the
role of American prime contractors, national firms serve as the main
subcontractors, and a large but diminishing number of designs and components
come from the US. Both industries (and their government customers) rely
heavily on exports to lower unit costs.27
The industrial structure of Japanese aerospace production is very
different. As noted earlier, the industry is organized as divisions of
diversified companies, which in turn are affiliated with important keiretsu,
the finance-centered business groups decended from the prewar zaibatsu
trusts. As a result, aerospace is more closely linked to other industrial
sectors, both within the firms and within the keiretsu. Presumably, this
closer linkage promotes both the identification of multiple use technologies
and their intersectoral transfer, by reducing the organizational boundaries
over which opportunities must be perceived and through which technologies
must pass.2 8
The industry is far more concentrated than in the U.S, with three firms
controlling over 90% of the prime contract market. Mitsubishi alone has
almost half, Kawasaki and IHI about one quarter each. Fuji Heavy Industries
accounts for much of the rest, giving the "big four" essentially complete
responsibility for Japanese aircraft production. Extensive vertical
integration within these companies and other historic ties lead to a
different pattern of subcontracting than is common in the West; often other
keiretsu members are major beneficiaries. Mitsubishi Electric (MELCO), for
example, is the leading supplier of avionics, while Mitsubishi Precision,
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created in 1962 by MHI, MELCO, Mitsubishi Trading, the Mitsubishi Bank and
US General Precision, is a leading supplier of instrumentation.2 9
Relatedly, the industry is also far more openly collusive than in the
US. The Japanese describe it as a sort of "friendship club" (nakayoshi
kurabu) built within a "village society" (mura shakai), and based upon
"mutual knowledge" (tsuka). 30 The central purpose of the First Aircraft
Industry Promotion Law of 1954 was to cartelize the industry with
inducements to interfirm cooperation and the law and its successors have
been very successful in this regard. 1 From the Japan Jet Engine Consortium
established in July 1953 to the "Orient Express" hypersonic plane project
now on the drawing boards, every MITI, STA, and JDA program has been divided
up such that the big four participate significantly in each one, regardless
of which among them has been designated military prime contractor or
commercial consortium leader.
Collaboration often begins with research and development upstream and
nearly every project combines several firms that would otherwise (and
elsewhere) likely be competitors. Participating firms often protect
proprietary information, yet the extent of their collaboration and the
stability of the partnerships are extraordinary by American standards.
Several prominent examples include collaboration in new materials that is
conducted under the aegis of MITI's Agency for Industrial Science and
Technology Program for "Research for Basic Technologies for the Future
Industries." This program supports the R&D Institute of Metals and
Composites for Future Industries, which consigns a significant portion of
its research support to aerospace firms for work on metal and polymer
matrices, and carbon fibers. Additionally, SJAC (with MITI support) has
successfully diffused metal bending and processing technologies to its
members.3 2 The big four (in collaboration with thirty-three other firms)
are jointly developing a quiet, fuel efficient, low pollution, all-Japanese
"Advanced Turboprop" engine with funding from the government's Key
Technology Center. Here, too, they are collaboratively focused upon new
materials, process technologies, design, and optics problems.3 3 The same
players are simultaneously engaged in the Japan Aero Engines joint venture
with the IAE to build a turboprop for large commercial aircraft. These
firms again join to form the Japanese consortium participating with Boeing
in its 767 and 7J7 aircraft, in military projects such as the T-2 and XT-4
trainers, the FS-X, and, of course, the ill-fated YS-11. In short, the
division of labor has been remarkably stable; after 30 years of carefully
orchestrated work-sharing, coordinated investment strategies, and managed
competition between the leading firms, all backed by extensive state
support, are prominent features of the industry.
Finally, the Japanese industry has historically lacked independent
capability in key segments of the value chain, notably systems-level R&D and
design, systems integration in both senses, and international sales and
support. The industry's mainstay has been licensed co-production of US
warplanes, for which R&D has been long since completed, for which all
systems integration problems have already been solved, and for which export
sales are out of the question. Co-production, even with steadily increasing
_ -
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local content, is equivalent to following a script; Japanese officials often
deplore co-production as a transfer of "know-how" but not "know-why." As we
will see, however, Japan has made considerable progress in remedying these
deficiencies during the 1980s, and is poised to take advantage of and to
continue this progress. One senior industry leader described how Japanese
firms now approach licensed co-production by using the metaphor of a hand-
me-down garment: "First you put it on, then you grow out of it." 34
V.3. The Next Generation
The transformation of aerospace from metal-bending to integrating
multiple advanced technologies continues to recast the production of
military aircraft. The industrial requirements of the fighter business have
changed radically in the last decade due to a revolution in design made
possible by cumulative advance in materials and electronics, and made urgent
by the proliferation of precision-guided anti-aircraft munitions. The old
school of design, stressing size and speed, reached its peak in the early
1970s with the F-15, a very large and very fast all-metal airplane with
mechanical controls and instruments, and with radar and radios essentially
bolted in.3 5 The F-16 and F-18, dating from the mid 1970's, blend old and
new technology and are best considered transitional aircraft. The next
generation, still in the R&D stage, makes extensive use of a broad range of
new technologies: composite structural materials for lighter weight, lower
observability and more streamlined shapes; "fly-by-wire," in which
mechanical controls are replaced by computer-controlled actuators, and
software algorithms actually fly the plane; miniaturized, more sophisticated
and more tightly coupled sensors, displays and avionics, now tied directly
into the computerized flight control system; and the odd-looking control
surfaces, unstable aerodynamics, and extreme agility made possible by
fly-by-wire, known as "control configured vehicles," or CCV.36 The
confluence of these new technologies will bring higher performance and
"survivability" to the next generation of fighters.
The changing technology has already brought new skill requirements and
much higher costs and complexity to the aircraft development process, and
structural change to the industry. European firms and governments are
struggling to form a follow-on consortia to the Panavia organization of the
F-15 era, and US prime contractors have been forced into unprecedented
teaming arrangements to spread costs and risks that DoD is no longer willing
to absorb. To accommodate the next generation within the declining defense
budgets of the late Reagan administration, DOD began insisting that former
arch rivals collaborate on the dwindling number of new major projects, and
assume much of the cost of competitive development without the guarantee of
a future monopoly. Both next generation fighter projects, the Navy's ATA
and the Air Force's ATF, are being developed in this manner. At least one
and perhaps two or three US producers are likely to exit the tactical
aircraft business, and others may disappear through merger and
divestiture.3 7 Those that remain will participate in either teamed
I I ____
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production of new aircraft or in the growing market for more affordable
programs to retrofit new technologies into existing aircraft.
How might these disruptive changes affect Japanese ambitions? It is
tempting to argue that they can only increase the competitive advantage of
experienced US firms serving the enormous American market, thus raising the
threshold and rendering any Japanese fighter project somewhat quixotic. We
believe, however, that they will have precisely the opposite effect: the
specific requirements of the next generation make virtues of the distinctive
technological, organizational and managerial characteristics of Japanese
industry. Technologically, Japan is on the leading edge in advanced
materials, microelectronics, and other relevant areas, a potential advantage
that the "spin-on" strategy deliberately exploits. Organizationally, since
much of the new technology originates in other industries, Japanese
aerospace's tighter intersectoral links should assist its identification and
transfer. Managerially, Japanese firms have thirty years of experience with
interfirm cooperation, while it is a brave new world for their American
counterparts. Finally, it should be noted that Japan will move towards the
next generation via an upgrade program, albeit an extensive one, that
combines the benefits of new technology with the economic advantage of
starting from an existing aircraft. The transitional and widely acclaimed
F-16 which they have chosen for the FS-X project is an ideal platform.
VI. THE CASE OF THE FS-X
VI.1. The Requirement
Under the "roles and missions" philosophy that guides defense
cooperation between the US and Japan in the 1980s, Tokyo has agreed to
assume primary responsibility for protecting her territory, airspace,
coastal waters, and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles.38 Expanded airpower is
necessary to meet these objectives, as illustrated by former Prime Minister
Nakasone's vow to make Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." The current
structure of Japanese airpower shows the legacy of dependence on American
aerospace: of thirty-six types of aircraft deployed by the three Japanese
services, nine are imported, sixteen coproduced, and among the remaining
eleven are several direct copies of low technology US aircraft. The Japan
Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) currently flies three different fighters, and
two of them -- the F-4J and F-15J -- were designed by McDonnell Douglas and
coproduced by consortia led by MHI. The F-1 close support aircraft, the
first and thus far only postwar Japanese fighter, was designed and built by
the MHI consortium without formal Western assistance, but like the other two
and the upcoming SX-3, it is powered by engines produced under license by
IHI.
The F-1, which first flew in 1977, is much smaller, slower and less
capable than the F-4 and F-15, designed in the late 1950s and 1960s
respectively.3 9 The production run of 80 or so ended in 1983, by which time
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JASDF was already concerned about technical obsolescence in the avionics,
metal fatigue in the airframe, and the stiffer requirements posed by new
"roles and missions" responsibilities and the buildup of Soviet power in the
region. The JDA decided to accelerate replacing the F-1 and thus was born
the formal requirement for the FS-X (or Fighter-Support/Experimental). Some
of the F-4Js would also need replacement later in the decade, and although
this issue was not explicitly linked to the FS-X procurement, the two could
not be disentangled.
The need for new aircraft was uncontroversial, but settling the
specifics immediately gave rise to a domestic debate, a debate best
understood in the institutional, international and historical context of
Japanese defense procurement. Defense production in the US is settled by
the Department of Defense and Congress, with muted complaints from the
Office of Management and Budget, occasional intervention by the President,
and constant lobbying by industry. In Japan, proposals originate within
JDA, are passed on for MITI's modifications and approval, and attract
considerable attention from the ministries of finance and foreign affairs.
The JDA has been traditionally unconcerned with the commercial implications
of its procurement plans, but naturally prefers domestic production to
simplify maintenance and repair. MITI's participation, however, injects a
clearly articulated industrial policy component that favors domestic content
and industrial development for reasons only partially related to defense.
MITI's position is strongly supported, of course, by the heavy industrial
companies. The powerful Finance Ministry predictably favors least-cost
solutions, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) serves to remind all
that the US (and Japan's neighbors) are keenly interested in Japanese
defense procurement.
VI.2. The Domestic Debate: Initial Positions
There were few surprises at the outset of the FS-X debate in the early
1980's, although both MITI and the JDA were internally divided. Private
industry, the JDA's Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) and
Air Staff Office, and MITI's Aircraft and Ordnance Office, were the most
active proponents of domestic development, while MITI's Trade Bureau and JDA
budget officials were opposed. Finance and Foreign Ministry officials
concerned with budgets and US-Japanese relations were reported to be
cautious or opposed. The other ministries were united in opposition and
were joined by Japan's perennial opposition parties.4 0
Early arguments that the time had come for Japan to design an advanced
aircraft were strengthened by clear indications that the US was adopting a
tougher stance on technology transfer. Regarding the F-l, Japan had
originally sought to co-produce an American plane but was turned down
because DOD felt that they could make a sale; when JDA then sought to
license avionics technology for their domestic program, DOD turned them down
again.4 1 Tne contrast between F-4J co-production in the 1970's and the
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F-15J program just getting underway was also instructive. In the F-4
program, as in the F-104 program of the 1960's, the US had adopted a very
liberal attitude towards technology transfer and work-sharing, and Japanese
content and aerospace "know-how" rose accordingly. Many more restrictions
were applied to the F-15 program. The most advanced 40% of the aircraft was
to be perpetually imported "black boxes," and DOD refused to release a
sensitive electronics warfare system in any form; meanwhile the US Congress
was complaining that the program was overly generous.
Proponents also argued that with Western aerospace industries about to
incorporate major technological advances in a new generation of fighters,
and with the FS-X slated to be the only major new procurement program for a
decade, Japan would fall hopelessly behind if it settled for restricted
co-production of an existing aircraft. TRDI issued a report concluding that
domestic development was within the technical grasp of Japanese industry,
while MHI invoked the experimental TRDI/Mitsubishi T-2 Control Configured
Vehicle as additional evidence that Japanese industry could go it alone.
The solemn remarks of MHI president Suenaga Soichiro were typical:
"If a foreign type is applied, there will remain no
opportunity for new development in this century, and our
development capability will be far behind international
levels. A national design is necessary by all means."4 2
In the early 1980s, however,.this position was a minority viewpoint
even within JDA and MITI. There were few reasons to believe that Japan had
the technological or budgetary resources to design and build a competitive
fighter. There were many reasons to believe that she did not, including the
unsatisfactory F-1, the new generation getting underway in the West,
technical problems and delays in the T2 CCV project, and the fiscal
austerity then crimping all budgets save defense. The high cost of such a
project generated particular opposition, and although the Japanese
government has always been willing to pay a co-production premium for jobs
and technology transfer, the proposed FS-X project entailed a different
magnitude of expense.4 3 Given the uncertain success and high cost of a
fighter development program spread over the short production run of a plane
needed in limited quantities and unavailable for export, budget officials in
JDA, MITI, and especially the Ministry of Finance viewed domestic
development as a good way to pay more and buy less. These officials were
already quarreling over the cost of the military build-up, and the domestic
option received little initial support and generated much opposition.
Officials at the MOFA and MITI expressed additional concern at the
predictably negative reaction of the US, still the ultimate guarantor of
Japan's defense and its largest trading partner. Aerospace was one of the
few industries where the US ran a consistent surplus, and it had become a
traditional means of alleviating trade tension. When US policymakers
expressed alarm over the widening deficit in the late 1970's, MITI and the
Economic Planning Agency acted to defuse the situation by subsidizing the
purchase of $1 billion worth of unneeded American transports for lease in
the world market.44 In 1978, acting under pressure from the MOFA, the JDA
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agreed to reduce further the Japanese content in the upcoming F-15J
program.4 5 With the trade surplus expanding rapidly in the early 1980's,
officials concerned with US relations were reviving the transport leasing
program, and viewed the proposal for a domestic fighter as a step in the
wrong direction.
Given the breadth and depth of opposition, it was apparent that a
foreign design would be selected if the FS-X decision was made on schedule
in 1984; indeed, JDA procurement officials earmarked funds in the 1981-1986
five year plan to buy 24 aircraft and solicited bids from the West.4 6
Moreover, the FS-X timetable rested on an assumption of co-production or
outright purchase, and did not allow enough time for indigenous development
even if the decision was favorable: the F-ls were to be replaced late in the
1980's, but a domestic aircraft could not be available before the end of the
decade at the earliest. From the FS-X advocates' perspective, delay was
imperative.
VI.3. Strategic Delay
Technical and structural obsolescence were driving the need for
near-term replacement of the fighters. JASDF, TRDI and MHI came up with an
inexpensive solution known as the "Service Life Extension Program" (SLEP).
Ironically, both the idea and the technology were imported from the US,
where SLEPs are common practice. The JDA had begun investigating them in
the mid 1970's with an eye to the future of their F-4 fleet. In 1981, a
team of engineers from TRDI and MHI was dispatched to the States to study US
methods for reinforcing high stress areas on airframes. In 1982, MHI was
awarded a contract to reinforce and refit a single F-4J with advanced
avionics and armaments, extending its useful life well into the 1990's. In
1984, the five Western firms that had submitted FS-X proposals were told
that consideration of foreign aircraft had been dropped for the time being
in favor of an F-1 SLEP, and that the modified F-1 would last another five
years. In early 1986, MHI was awarded a $400 million contract to update 100
F-4Js.4 7
But the SLEP strategy was much more than a technological "quick fix."
By extending the service life of the F-1 by four years, the Japanese were
giving domestic producers breathing space to get their own FS-X program up
and running:
"Time for producing a domestic FS-X was thereby
ensured...These four years provide a golden opportunity
for domestic development because the powerful rivals of
a domestic FS-X will have become obsolete by the mid-
1990's..48
"The JDA, mindful of the need to nurture a domestic
aircraft industry, had been set all along on using the
FS-X procurement as an opportunity for the development
of a new fighter plane...A domestic plane would put
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Japanese manufacturers in the driver's seat, help
nurture their capabilities, and ultimately assist our
future needs...Postponement will tilt the scale in favor
of domestic development."49
The SLEP strategy was a resounding success because it offered something
to all parties. Budget officials at JDA and the Finance Ministry were
delighted because it delayed funding new aircraft years into the future.
The US and MOFA were mollified temporarily, for much of the F-4J contract
was slated for American avionics, and because in a separate decision, the
length of the F-15J production run was extended. MHI got a substantial
contract and experience with integrating digital avionics, while JASDF got
uninterrupted deployment. More importantly, the SLEP contracts gave
Japanese industry additional time to prepare, and perhaps most important,
deployment rescheduled into the 1990's winnowed the field of potential
competitors. Western planes designed in the 1970s would be technically
obsolete.
Despite the window of opportunity opened by SLEP, however, convincing
the critics that a Japanese FS-X was viable remained a challenging task; if
the aerospace coalition was to prevail when the decision reappeared on the
agenda, they had to overcome wide-spread and well-founded skepticism about
the level of domestic technology and the lack of aerospace experience.
VI.4. Technology Development
JDA began funding next-generation fighter studies in the late 1970s,
primarily to identify requisite technologies. On the basis of their
findings, TRDI focussed attention, efforts and funding on advanced
metallurgy, composite materials, stealth technology, advanced avionics and
CCV. One aspect of these efforts was a traditional quest for American
technology, despite increasing US reticence. In the case of the F-15, the
JDA was able to overcome or at least reduce this reluctance by bargaining
and persistence:
"Among the items initially withheld were some that were open
to reconsideration as passage of time made them less
sensitive. The JDA pursued DOD on this list every year for
the first 5-6 years of the program and eventually got
everything short of what was firmly "non-negotiable."5 0
In an important break from past practice, however, TRDI placed main
emphasis on creating indigenous expertise in the key technologies, and took
advantage of the higher defense budgets to step up funding in its own labs
and at the major aerospace and electronics firms. A noteworthy feature of
the ensuing domestic development program was the manner in which contracts
were conceived and organized in close correspondence with the value-added
chain (Figure 2). Numerous small contracts were let for component
development in each of the six aerospace subsectors. A smaller number of
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subsystem contracts, even fewer system contracts, and only one full scale
development and production program were awarded. Each contract, whatever
its type or magnitude, was focused on some aspect of the larger issue of
technological and industrial capability, and all were scheduled to show
results by 1986.51
Figure Two about here: Table of Contracts
VI.5. Strategic Systems Integration
While the proliferation of smaller contracts were targeted at improving
indigenous capabilities in specific segments of the value chain, the fewer
but larger contracts aimed along the full length of the chain -- at systems
integration -- deserve special mention. Two of the contract types, upgrade
programs and prototypes, replicate in miniature important aspects of the
systems integration experience provided by a full scale program but with
lower costs and in less time. The F-4J SLEP, in which MHI rebuilt the
planes from scratch and installed and integrated a completely new (though
mostly American) avionics suite, thus provided benefits extending beyond
deferred replacement. TRDI followed up the SLEP with the XSH-60J program,
in which two American helicopters were bought "green" and fitted with mostly
Japanese avionics. Eleven advanced systems were joined together in the
aircraft, which JDA called "a platform for national capability development,"
and which domestic firms and TRDI planned and executed, though with
substantial Western assistance. 5 2 In a program that combined the
development of key technologies with systems integration experience, MHI was
awarded the contract to convert a jet trainer into a prototype CCV.
While work on advanced components, upgrades and prototypes narrowed the
gap in technology and experience, it did not address the criticism that
Japanese industry completely lacked experience managing the development and
production of a completely new aircraft: even the three major postwar
"domestic" designs relied on imported or coproduced engines, avionics and
other major subsystems. 5 3 The FS-X advocates were proposing to undertake a
multi-year project involving billions of dollars, multiple organizations,
thousands of highly skilled people and countless risks. Cost overruns,
schedule slippage and technical problems are endemic, and the demands on
management are high. Systems integration skills in the narrower sense are
necessary but not sufficient; there is no substitute for experience managing
the full process.
The JDA responded to these concerns with design and production of the
supersonic XT-4 jet trainer. Trainers are smaller, simpler and much less
expensive than fighters, so the decision to pursue national development was
relatively uncontroversial; the program first appeared in the budget as an
$8 million item, and received only token resistance from MOFA bureaucrats,
who suggested foreign engines to appease trading partners. But, overseas
firms were formally excluded in 1980. The consortium awarded this project
was by now familiar: KHI would take the lead as prime contractor
responsible for 40% of the airframe. MHI and FHI were each allotted 30%,
Figure 2: Japanese Military Aircraft Programs in the 1980's
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and IHI would provide its XF3 engine. In all, 43 firms are participating in
the project and will build two hundred aircraft. This is the first Japanese
aircraft to use carbon fiber on a large scale and to use all Japanese
aluminum plates, and the first to employ large scale use of computer-aided
design and manufacturing. It is also the first aircraft project in which
the engine and the body development proceeded in parallel. No plane of the
postwar period has been comprised so exclusively of Japanese technology and
components.
The challenge of XT-4 development was more managerial than technical,
as it replicated in miniature all aspects of an FS-X program, but with less
demanding technology. A tight schedule, small budget, and almost equal
participation by the three major firms intensified the demand for skillful
management at every link in the value-added chain. Despite their
inexperience, Japanese managers proved their ability to meet these demands
when the first plane rolled out a month early and on budget, an exceedingly
rare event in aerospace. Equally unusual, the XT-4 reportedly met all
specifications during flight testing and entered production on schedule in
1986. 55 The complete success of the project contributed greatly to the
increasing self-confidence and domestic credibility of the Japanese
aerospace community, leading one US official at the time to note "peacock-
like tails over Mitsubishi and the others." 5 6
VI.6. The FS-X Decision: Trade and Technology
Although the FS-X ultimately became a trade issue, it was first and
foremost a controversial domestic decision with an uncertain outcome.
Japanese FS-X advocates were poorly received in the domestic arena when they
first presented their case in the early 1980's. If they had not been able
to delay the decision for several years, their defeat would have been
certain. When the decision reappeared on the agenda later in the decade,
however, they achieved many of their goals despite intense US pressure to
"buy American." Ironically, this same US pressure rallied support for
domestic production as an assertion of national sovereignty.
Five developments in the interim tipped the balance. First and
foremost, an industrial strategy carefully crafted to develop and
demonstrate the requisite technical and managerial skills came to fruition;
the Japanese aerospace industry circa 1988 can cite specific accomplishments
and argue credibly that it is now prepared for the FS-X, something it simply
could not do earlier in the decade. Second, the delay allowed the coalition
to redefine the FS-X as a possible replacement for two or perhaps even three
different aircraft types instead of the original one, paving the way for an
economically feasible development program. Third, by rescheduling
deployment from 1986 to 1997, the coalition could argue persuasively that
unmodified American aircraft designed in the early 1970s would be obsolete
when deployed. Fourth, a consensus emerged within industry and government
that dual use technology ought to be recognized and nurtured as such.
Finally, external events also played a role: renewed difficulties in
shipbuilding and the collapse of the Middle Eastern construction business
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intensified the heavy industrial companies' need to diversify and the
government's desire to help them do so. Simultaneously, growing frustration
with the 7J7 and IAE junior partnerships undoubtedly was undermining the
perceived wisdom of international collaboration in commercial programs, at
least as a junior partner, and was helping the "hard-liners" make their case
for domestic development. When the FS-X decision was finally made, domestic
opposition to domestic development had largely withered away, and only US
pressure, amplified by the Toshiba incident, remained a significant
obstacle.
In October 1987, Director-General Kurihara Yuko of the Japan Defense
Agency announced that Japan would forego domestic development of the FS-X
and instead spend $6 billion procuring a "lightly modified" American
aircraft. The decision was widely interpreted as a conciliatory gesture by
the departing Nakasone administration, as an unambiguous victory for the
United States, and as vindication of the intense pressure applied by US
congressmen and negotiators. American officials praised the Prime Minister
and Mr. Kurihara for realizing that given US strength in aerospace, the $60
billion trade deficit and concern about the "interoperability" of Japanese
and American military forces, a "buy American" policy was appropriate.
Senator John Danforth of Missouri, who had focused congressional attention
on the issue and who earlier warned Japan not to throw "large amounts of
gasoline on the already raging fires of protectionism," accepted the
announcement as a sign that Japan was "serious about improving trade
relations."5 7
Kurihara's announcement came as a surprise to many who had been
following the dispute, because the decision overrode strong opposition from
a coalition of officials within the Japanese defense establishment, MITI,
the heavy industrial companies, the Keidanren and the Diet. Since the late
1970s, this coalition had been laying the groundwork for an all-Japanese FS-
X, and they had become increasingly confident that their views would
prevail. Given their careful preparations and growing influence, it had
appeared unlikely that the US could exert sufficient pressure to win such a
victory, especially since excessive pressure ran the risk of being
counterproductive rather than countervailing. As it became apparent that
some sort of compromise was likely, the leading Japanese business daily
editorialized that the lame duck Nakasone administration was too weak to
resist US pressures and that the emerging "government, LDP and industry
stance" was that the decision should be left to its successor. 5 8
As the general framework for FS-X co-development was subsequently
worked out, the project was portrayed as less and less of a US victory in
the American press, yet as more and more of one in the Japanese press. 5 9
Neither portrayal is correct, and both fail to capture the essential
significance of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) approved eight months
after the announcement. The SX-3, as the plane is now called, will be an
extensively modified F-16 with a high level of Japanese content and
technology. The fuselage and the engine will remain generally unchanged,
but the wing, the avionics and the armaments will be largely Japanese.
Japan will lead the project, with a roughly 60-40 split of the development
--- -
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and production work. Given its strong resemblance to original proposals for
an "all domestic" aircraft, which itself rested on a base of borrowed
American technology, the SX-3 is clearly not an unambiguous US victory.6 0
Nor is it an unambiguous defeat. The 60-40 split is a genuine compromise
negotiated under intense and conflicting pressures on both sides.
At the heart of this compromise is a set of rules for technology
transfer that acknowledge Japan's rise as a technological power of the first
rank, and that are likely to become a model for future agreements.6 1 In
exchange for access to some of the American aerospace industry's most
sophisticated technology, the Japanese have agreed to return any
improvements they make at no charge and without being asked, and to make
available any original Japanese technology used in the program if it is
specifically requested and paid for. They have also agreed, in a separate
but closely linked issue, to make an exception to Japanese patent law and
permit US firms to have military patents held confidentially at JDA instead
of openly at MITI.6 2 In effect, the US is betting that Japanese firms can
improve US military aerospace technology by spinning-on commercial
manufacturing and electronics expertise, that US firms will learn and
exploit these improvements, and that the interests of both countries will be
served by such an arrangement.
Rather than a victory or defeat for either country, the FS-X agreement
is simply a reflection of the shifting terms of trade in advanced
technology, a shift noted by General Yamamoto Masashi, Director General of
JDA's Equipment Bureau and one-time Deputy Director General of MITI's
Machinery and Information Industries Bureau:
...I want you to regard it as a 'fusion of high
technologies.' At the final stage, the US side was extremely
co-operative, and Japan was able to negotiate on an equal
footing, for the first time, in regard to defense technology
... It is true that the gaps in the field of aircraft are
big, but as a result of Japan's having shown to what extent
it will be able to do things through the use of elemental
technology, such as onboard equipment, and partial systems,
we have been able to elicit the positive co-operation of US
manufacturers concerned. I think that this is epoch-
making. "63
A US DOD official who participated in these negotiations agreed, pointing
out that
"The Japanese made it very clear that the American side
needed to recognize the world had changed
considerably... When we proposed yet another co-
production project, the Japanese calmly urged us not to
be so 'nostalgic.' They insisted that the era of co-
development is upon us,,"64
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The $6 billion SX-3 co-development project will develop and test
Japan's ability to lead the redesign, manufacture, and systems integration
of a world-class jet fighter, one of the most technologically sophisticated
products ever devised, and one considerably more demanding in many respects
than a commercial transport. Although.not the total victory sought by
advocates of domestic development, SX-3 co-development will give the
Japanese aerospace industry a powerful technological and financial boost.
It provides a formal structure for access to American expertise in areas
where Japan lags. It will give a generation of Japanese aerospace engineers
design experience with high performance aircraft. And it will provide a
massive capital inflow to underwrite continued expansion of the aerospace
industrial infrastructure, including the base of dual-use technology,
production equipment, and skilled employment in the plants where military
and commercial production take place in tandem. It is very different from
the co-production model that it replaces, and it will unquestionably advance
Japan's long range plans to compete effectively in world aerospace markets.
VII. CONCLUSION
We do not suggest that revitalization and growth of the defense
industry is a unanimous goal of Japanese leaders, uncontested in domestic
bureaucratic or democratic politics, or that it is uninfluenced by external
events, particularly conflicting pressures from the United States. To the
contrary, we have shown how the subject is highly controversial both
domestically and in the larger context of US-Japanese relations. Our
analysis of the different organizations involved in the case of the FS-X
reveals many different interests and agendas. No "consensus" for rearmament
is apt suddenly to emerge. Most important, we certainly do not suggest an
impending resurgence of Japanese militarism, a different matter altogether.
We do argue, however, that increased defense production has emerged in
the 1980's as a new strategy for aerospace industrial development, that it
has emerged because it is a versatile and effective strategy that satisfies
the needs and interests of numerous influential groups, and that it has
become the basis for a sturdy political coalition. Convinced that aerospace
can help revitalize the troubled heavy industrial sector and spread high-
technology benefits throughout the economy, frustrated in attempts to
develop commercial aircraft, anxious to capitalize on new opportunities to
exploit domestic technology, and continually pressured by the United States
to rearm more vigorously, Japanese policymakers in the 1980s have turned to
military spending as a mechanism for industrial development.
The Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Dbykai) made the
case for this strategy a decade ago, when it recognized that single domestic
markets are never large enough to sustain national production. Their report
argues that even then Japanese fighter aircraft were technologically, but
not economically competitive because of export constraints. Low cost
"efficient mass production" was possible only through government
__. I________ lsL___ I
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procurement. The link between civilian and military production was stated
explicitly:
"Generally, the dependence upon military aircraft
production is high in developing countries and is low in
countries with a well developed aerospace industry. In
this sense, Japan is clearly a latecomer, as our
aircraft industry is nurtured by the high capital costs
and technological requirements of military demand that,
in turn establish the base for an advance into civilian
areas."
Naito Ichiro, the former head of the JDA's Technical Research and
Development Institute, echoed this by pointing out:
"Once demand for fighter aircraft exceeds 300 units it
will be possible to establish a mass production system
(that eventually) will enable us to gain sight of the
civil aircraft market... 66
Morikawa Hiroshi, the Executive Director of the Keidanren Defense Production
Committee, has linked the specific case of the FS-X to the current problems
in commercial aircraft development:
"We have no alternative but to pin our hopes on the
FS-X, given the current lack of progress in plans to
jointly develop civilian aircraft." 7
Industrial development is the key variable because competitiveness is
central to Japan's definition of national security. In large measure due to
American security guarantees, postwar Japan has measured national security
far more by industrial strength than by military power. While quietly
questioning the capabilities and commitment of the declining American
hegemon, Japanese planners continue to build their future upon the
foundation of high value-added industrial technologies. Aerospace, with
the added attraction of military application, is considered vitally
important. This importance remains undiminished by past setbacks and
continuing difficulties in efforts to develop a competitive presence.
The report of a MITI advisory commission in 1986, when the 7J7 still
appeared promising, indicates that MITI was well-aware of the obstacles but
undeterred. The report introduced its recommendations for increased public
support of aerospace by highlighting derivative technological benefits, and
went on to discuss the problem:
"Every nation is avidly promoting its aerospace sector
in order to strengthen their technology base...The
strengthening of the Western European and the US
aerospace oligopoly in large and medium sized planes,
combined with the emergence of a light aircraft industry
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in the developing countries, means that if a Japanese
aircraft industry is to survive, it will have to escape
through a very narrow gate."6 8
This MITI report, the first proposing the International Aircraft Development
Fund, stressed two fundamental benefits of a healthy aerospace sector: 1)
economic expansion and 2) enhanced national security through technological
independence and sophistication. Japan's goal was clearly to make its
aircraft industry equal to the rest of the world by the early part of the
next century, and in so doing, contribute to the economy in every related
area. These relationships are commonly embodied in the metaphor of a tree
that provides the technologies and the products (from roots to fruits) that
will sustain Japan into the twenty-first century (Figure 3).
Figure Three here: MITI Tree
Beneath the hyperbole and simplicity, this metaphor reveals a way of
thinking about how success or failure in aerospace has profound implications
for the future of Japanese industry. The perceived benefits extend well
beyond creating new business for the heavy industrial companies. They
extend past the explicit linkages between avionics and electronics, systems
design and computer science, "space-age plastics" and ceramics and alloys
that will never leave the ground. They extend past the multitude of other
opportunities for spinning technologies off and on among military and
commercial aerospace and the rest of the industrial economy. In this
vision, machinery, housing, automotive, leisure, and service industries are
each linked systematically to a healthy and active aerospace sector. The
benefits are commercial and technological.69 But they cannot be divorced
from their implications for Japanese national security. Nor, we insist,
will they be derived entirely from commercial projects. We expect a vibrant
military aerospace program, revolving on an axis of indigenous dual use
technology, to help push the Japanese commercial aircraft industry through
the "narrow gate," to what policy planners and industrialists believe will
be greener and safer pastures.
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NOTES
1. These refer only to hojokin loans. Data are from Table 12-3 in Wakasugi,
Ryohei. Gijutsu Kakushin to KenkyQ Kaihatsu no Keizai Bunseki Tokyo: Ty6
Keizai, 1986.
2. For a typical press account, see Aerospace America (March 1987), which
claimed (with some alarm) that in each major case of aerospace technology
licensing from US to Japanese firms, licensing was phased out in favor of
independent projects as the Japanese firms developed their own design and
integration skills.
For an optimistic analysis see Orit Frenkel, "Flying High: A Case Study of
Japanese Industrial Policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.
3, No. 3 (1984).
For scholarly pessimism, see David Mowery. Alliance Politics and Economics
Cambridge., MA: Ballinger, 1987. and Thomas Roehl, "Emerging Sources of
Foreign Competition in the Commercial Aircraft Manufacturing Industry: The
Japanese Aircraft Industry" Report to the United States Department of
Transportation. (June 1985); and Thomas Roehl and J. Frederick Truitt,
"Japanese Industrial Policy in Aircraft Manufacturing," International
Marketing Review (Summer 1987).
3. To put the Western jetliner business into market perspective, consider
that as of 1984, $180 billion in total postwar sales had yielded an
estimated net loss of $40 billion, without counting the costs of essential
research, development and manufacturing facilities spun off from military
programs. Three out of the total 29 jet transports designed and built have
passed break-even; the Boeing Corporation that makes all three is just now
beginning to reap positive returns from thirty years of activity, after
being launched into the business by military production and sustained
through many bad years by government contracts. The Airbus consortium among
European military aircraft firms is quite unlikely ever to recover its
sponsors' full investments, even disregarding the time value of money. For
an excellent summary, see Wolfgang and Christopher Demisch, "The Jetliner
Business," First Boston Research Special Report, AE1991, October 5, 1984.
4. For more details on this form of industrial organization, see Chalmers
Johnson, Japan's Public Policy Companies Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute, 1978 and Richard J. Samuels The Business of the Japanese State:
Energyv Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987.
5. In order to facilitate this shift, the Aircraft Industry Promotion Act
was revised in April 1986. The legal objective was changed from "promotion
of domestic production" to "promotion of joint international development" of
aircraft. Symbolically, this revision also abolished the long moribund
Nippon Aircraft Manufacturing Company, maker of the YS-11. See Tsfisan Khb,
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February 1986. A new public corporation was also established. This
"International Aircraft Development Fund" was designed to make funds
available to Japanese manufacturers despite severe budgetary constraints
imposed by the Ministry of Finance and despite foreign pressures to
eliminate "targeting." The result was a creative financing package that
supports only joint international ventures through off-budget financing and
that establishes a permanent "kitty" for the aircraft makers.
6. Wall Street Journal, 17 February 1988.
7. The Japanese press continued to run positive "puff pieces" on the
progress of the IAE long after IAE's ongoing problems have been chronicled
in the western press. Compare, for example, the Asahi Simbun 26 June 1988
and Aviation Week, 3 June 1985; 7 July 1986; 16 February 1987; 16 March
1987; 13 April 1987, 25 May 1987; 9 November 1987.
8. There are several studies in English that identify and discuss these
problems. See, for example: Mowrey, David C. Alliance Politics and
Economics: Multinational Joint Ventures in Commercial Aircraft.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987. Roehl, Thomas and J. Frederick Truitt,
"Japanese Industrial Policy in Aircraft Manufacturing, " International
Marketing Review, Summer 1987, pp. 21-32; Mowrey, David C. and Nathan
Rosenberg. "The Japanese Commercial Aircraft Industry Since 1945: Government
Policy, Technical Development, and Industrial Structure," Occasional Paper
of the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy, 1985;
Frenkel, Orit. "Flying High: A Case study of Japanese Industrial Policy,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Volume 3 Number 3. pp.406-420,
1984. For an optimistic view by a leading Japanese bank, see Long Term
Credit Bank of Japan, ed., "The Japanese Aircraft Industry: Entering a
Period of Progress Spurred by International Joint Development," (May 1986).
For MITI's view, see Kkiiki Kgy6 Shingikai Kkiki Kgy6 Bukai, ed. Kbkaki
Kbgya no Tmen suru Kihon Mondai to Seifu Hojo no Arikata ni Tsuite (Chikan
Hbkoku) (The Current State of Government Assistance and Basic Problems in
the Aircraft Industry- A Midterm Report).
9. David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, "Commercial Aircraft: Cooperation and
Competition Between the US and Japan," California Management Review, Vol.
XXVII No. 4 (Summer 1985), p.7 7.
10. Japanese aircraft technology was considerable in this period. A
Japanese plane, the Kamikaze-go set a world flight distance record in 1938,
and Japanese firms were building experimental jet engines and aircraft by
the end of the war. For a study of the wartime aircraft industry
structure, see Asajima, Shoichi "Senji Taiseiki no Nakajima Hik&ki," (The
Nakajima Aircraft Company during the Wartime Period) Keieishi Gaku Volume
20, Number 3, 1985.
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11. This "ban" was actually a 1967 reinforcement of a 1949 Export Trade
Control Order prohibiting foreign sales of arms. Fearing a domestic
backlash against its cooperation with the US military in Vietnam, Prime
Minister Sato Eisaku's Cabinet put forth the "Three Principles," proscribing
sales to Communist countries, countries at war, and those apt to engage in
international disputes. In 1976, Prime Minister Miki extended this to
weapons technology as well. In 1981 the United States requested a revision
allowing it to import Japanese military technology, and in 1983 Prime
Minister Nakasone granted their wish. See Reinhard Drifte. Arms Production
in Japan: The Military Applications of Civilian Technologies, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1986.
12. Mitsubishi Handbook, 1986. 1985 sales of the Aircraft and Special
Vehicles Division surpassed 314 billion yen, second only to Power Systems.
This does not include automobiles, which were spun off into the Mitsubishi
Motor Corporation in 1970.
Other signals of Japan's shifting calculus on the defense-industrial
linkage include the 1983 technology transfer agreement and participation by
Japanese firms in the American Strategic Defense Initiative. (For details on
the negotiations concerning Japanese industrial participation in SDI, see
Michael W. Chinworth, JEI Report, 8 May 1987.) There is also public debate
underway concerning the production of "light carriers" that would
simultaneously revive ship production and help Japan fulfill its commitment
to defend the 1,000 mile sea lanes. Internally, there is the transformation
of corporate charters, such as Komatsu's entry into the missile business in
1987, and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries' new division in 1988 devoted
entirely to weapons systems. (See the Japan Economic Journal, 19 December
1987 and Aviation Week 14 March 1988).
13. In 1988, for the first time, the top career position in the JDA was
given to Nishihiro Seishi, and the top post within the JDA's Technical
Research and Deveopment Institute was given to Tsutsui Ryozo, both career
JDA officials. The position of JDA Equipment Bureau Chief has been a
virtual MITI monopoly.
14. In the mid 1970s, the full dimensions and costs of YS-11 failure were
readily apparent to officials of MITI's Aircraft and Ordnance Bureau and
their superiors. The commercial aircraft strategy was in disarray, as was
the Japanese budget. The Ministry of Finance made it quite clear that the
government could not afford to sponsor a follow-on program similar in scale
and scope to the YS-11, and MITI planners knew that no such program would
emerge without their sponsorship. Officials articulated the new strategy of
international collaboration and arranged two new consortia (one for
airframes and one for engines), but most of the decade passed without a
clear definition of their purpose: negotiations with Boeing began in 1973
but did not yield the 767 agreement until 1978, and the engine consortium
idled along from 1971 until it joined with Rolls Royce in 1979. Between
1972 and 1977, hours worked in the aerospace industry declined by two
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thirds. See Aviation Week 21 March 1977.
15. TheJapanese press continues to report on possibilities for civilian
aircraft projects. Some, such as the "follow-on" to the YS-11 has been
championed by the Transportation Ministry and by MITI, which is now
subsidizing feasibility studies. The reported goal is to eliminate
dependence upon foreign manufacturers in the long run. Other projects
mentioned are helicopter engine cooperation with MBB of West Germany,
commuter planes with China, and hypersonic transports with the United
States. See the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 April 1988, 9 May 1988, and 7 May
1988.
16. The more general point about the declining importance of "spillover"from
military to commercial aircraft is made by Mowery, David. Alliance Politics
and Economics: Multinational Joint Ventures in Commercial Aircraft,
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987, p.4 8 -9.
17. Tsush6sangy6sh6 Daijin Kanbb, ed. Nippon no Sentaku (Japan's Choices)
Tokyo: June 1988, p. 116.
18. More recently this has included demands that the JDA expand its
procurement program and broaden its definition of defense items to include
so-called "rear support expenses" such as communications, fuel, and other
items. See Asahi Shimbun 12 April 1985. Also see Reinhard Drifte, op. cit.
19. The aircraft division of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry which had built
17,000 aircraft and 54,000 engines, for example, was broken up into three
firms that focused upon auto bodies, internal combustion engines, scooters,
and agricultural equipment. Nakajima Hikoki, which ultimately became Fuji
Heavy Industries, was divided by SCAP into twelve firms. Kawasaki became a
manufacturer of fire extinguishers, textile machinery, and bus bodies. See
Kuno and Rubin (1984-6) and in the original, see Kuno, Masao. Nihon no
Kbkzki Uchi Sangy6. (The Japanese Aerospace Industry) Tokyo: Daiyamondo,
1984. Also see the postwar history produced by the Society of Japanese
Aerospace Companies, Nihon no KkO Ucha Kgy6 Sengoshi. Note that in 1952,
as soon as restrictions were removed with the end of the Occupation, the MHI
firms, the KHI firms, and the FHI firms were all reconsolidated. Ncte also
that the key players in the prewar aircraft industry returned as the
presidents and senior managing directors of these companies. Also see the
detailed company histories, such as Fuji Jkb, ed. Fuji Jkbgy6 Sanja Nen
Shi (The Thirty Year History of Fuji Heavy Industries) published in July
1984.
20. In all, nineteen different US military aircraft have been produced under
license by Japanese firms. Japan's first postwar aircraft export was Toyo
Koku's licensed version of the US Fletcher FD-26 trainer/attack plane sold to
Cambodia and Vietnam in the late 1950's; Japan's first export of aircraft
technology was a license for "wave suppressing sonar" sold to Grumman in the
1970's. In the entire postwar period, the value of commercial production
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surpassed military only at the height of the YS-11 program and quickly
returned to its traditional level of about 20% of output.
21. Interview with Civilian Aircraft Corporation official, Tokyo, 20 June 1988.
22. For example, FHI manufactures the main wing spars and horizontal
stabilizers of the P-3, the landing gear of the F-15, the entire UH1B
helicopter and the main wing cowling of the B-767 in the same plant.
Interview, official of the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Tokyo,
10 June 1987 and with a DoD official, Tokyo, 11 June 1987.
Another example is the landing gear for the commercial YS-11 that was
adopted directly from the co-produced KHI/Lockheed P2V-7 aircraft. This
example is drawn from Frenkel, o. cit.
23. Hall, G.R. and R.E. Johnson, "Transfers of United States Aerospace
Technology to Japan," pp. 305-363 in R. Vernon (ed.) The Technology Factor
in International Trade. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1970, p.315. Mowrey, op.cit., p. 56 and Roehl and Truitt, op.cit., p. 26
disagree, arguing that licensing and co-production has not provided Japanese
or any other firms the design experience necessary for an independent
aircraft industrial base. Hall and Johnson go on to argue, however, that
"co-production increased the rate, amount, and kinds of technological
information provided the Japanese by several orders of magnitude," including
even manufacturing "art" embodied in translated "blackbooks" of shop
foremen. (pp. 316-317).
24. For a (now slightly dated) introduction to the Japanese defense
industry, see Tomiyama, Kazuo. Nihon no Bei Sangyb (Japan's Defense
Industries) Tokyo: Ty6 Keizai, 1979. Also see Asahi Shimbun Shakalbu, ed.,
Heiki Sangy6 (The Weapons Industry) Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1986. News
reports are often revealing as well. Consider the following pair of stories
in the same newspaper on the same day: The first article describes how KHI
has begun a "large scale" transfer of personnel from shipbuilding to
aircraft due to the recession in the dockyards. The second story reports
that KHI has announced the use of industrial robots for its aircraft
manufacturing operations. See the Nikkei Sangya Shimbun 18 June 1986.
25. For a useful overview of the industry, see Masao Kuno and Paul Rubin
"Japanese Aerospace- Aiming for the Twenty-first Century," Aerospace Japan
July 1984 - February 1986. The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies now
publishes annually a detailed membership list and statistical abstract in
English called "The Aerospace Industry in Japan." Additionally, the Nikkei
Sangyb Shimbun and the Nikkan Kgy6 Shimbun provide detailed coverage of
these businesses.
26. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), the intense burst of energy released by the
atmospheric detonation of nuclear weapons, is a major concern for designers
of military electronic systems.
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27. See Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1980 for a discussion of US defense industrial structure.
28. It must be noted, however, that keiretsu affiliation is not a reliable
predictor of technological linkage in Japan. Firms increasingly are seeking
R&D partners from outside their own keiretsu group. See R.J. Samuels
"Research Collaboration in Japan," MIT-Japan Science and Technology Program
Working Paper 87-02, 1987 for a more systematic analysis.
29. Kazuo Tomiyama, "Revival and Growth of Japan's Defense Industry,"
Japanese Economic Studies Volume 9, Number 4, Summer 1981
30. These descriptions were provided in a series of interviews with senior
officials of the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, industry leaders,
and government officials, June 1988.
31. MITI long has favored this strategy for most industrial sectors but has
been generally unable to enforce it. One famous case is MITI's attempt to
keep Honda out of automobile production. See R.J. Samuels, The Business of
the Japanese State, 1987, op.cit., for a fuller explanation of the
relationship between the politics of oligopoly and industrial policy in
Japan. In any case, MITI encountered little opposition in aerospace, most
likely because the government procures four-fifths or more of industry output.
32. For a full list of SJAC-sponsored projects (many of which also attract
MITI support) see the SJAC yearbook: K6ka Uchz Kgy6 Nenkan. See also
Nikkei Aerospace 29 September 1986.
33. The firms participating in this consortium justify their cooperation by
reference to the need to "confront Western manufacturers," (MHI), to "expand
the Japanese share" of world markets (IHI), or to "compete with Western
firms." (FHI). Each clearly links this project to its broader technology
strategy.
34. Interview 22 June 1988, Tokyo.
35. The F-15, like all fighters, has been upgraded continuously since its
introduction. More recent models incorporate some composite materials and
are fitted with advanced avionics.
36. The flight characteristics of a control-configured aircraft are closer
to those of a flying saucer than of a traditional airplane. With
computerized manipulation of canards, winglets and other novel control
surfaces, a CCV can change altitude and flight path without changing
"attitude," the direction the vehicle is pointing. The advantages for
aerial combat and defensive maneuvering are significant.
37. This is certainly the prevailing view among Wall Street aerospace
analysts. See for example, Aviation Week 22 February 1987; Wall Street
Journal 31 October 1986.
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38. These new responsibilities were formally recognized in a 1981 joint
communique signed after talks between then Prime Minister Suzuki and
President Reagan. For discussion of the US-Japan defense relationship, see
Gregg A. Rubinstein, "US-Japan Security Relations: A Maturing Partnership,"
26 October 1987, and Michael W. Chinworth, "The Trade-Defense Linkage,"
Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 35A, 18 September 1987.
39. The F-1 is actually a reworked version of MHI's T-2 trainer, which in
turn is closely though informally modeled on the Anglo-French Jaguar, with
which it shares the French Aldour engine.
40. Asahi Shimbun 16 April 1985; Aviation Week 12 March 1984, 18 March 1985,
30 September 1985.
41. The plane in question was Northrop's F-5E. The story of the DOD's
refusal to release it is from personal correspondence from a former DOD
official 18 May 1988.
42. Aviation Week 18 March 1985.
43. The coproduction premium for the F15 is about $2 billion. However,
Hall and Johnson, op. cit., argue that Japan coproduced the F104 in the
1960's for 10% less than the cost of outright purchase, with the savings
accounted for by lower labor costs.
44. Aviation Week 16 January 1978.
45. Aviation Week 23 November 1981.
46. Initial candidates for the FS-X discussed in the Japanese press included
the General Dynamics F-16, the Panavia Tornado, the Harrier of British
Aerospace, and the McDonnell Douglas F-4. Much later, the McDonnell Douglas
F-18 was actively discussed, but was denigrated in the press as inferior.
47. The Japanese press tied the delay to the mid-term elections in the
United States. There was apparently some hope that a more congenial
Congress would reduce the pressure on Japan for co-production or outright
purchase. See Nikkei Aerospace 29 September 1986; Aviation Week 3 March
1980, 1 January 1981, 18 March 1985, 10 March 1986.
48. Airworld December 1985. See also the Asahi Shimbun April 16, 1985,
which suggested that the JDA and MHI were moving secretly in this direction
and were making every effort to shield the SLEP strategy from public debate,
and from the Japanese Diet in particular.
49. Nikkei Aerospace 29 September 1986.
50. Personal correspondence from a former DOD official 18 May 1988. See
also: "US Military Coproduction Agreements Assist Japan in Developing Its
Civilian Aircraft Industry," General Accounting Office, 1980.
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51. Aviation Week 9 March 1981, 10 March 1986.
52. Aviation Week 18 March 1985.
53. These were the C-1 of KHI, the F-1 of MHI, and the YS-11.
54. For a brief, but detailed overview, see Nikkei Aerospace, 13 May 1985,
pp. 1-6. The development of this aluminum plate capability is another
example of public/private cooperation to meet industrial goals. Alcoa
Aluminum had been the sole source to MHI/KHI of polished aluminum sheets for
the B-767, but could not deliver on time for the T-4. MHI/KHI encouraged
MITI and SJAC to establish the "Advanced Aerospace Technology Development
Center." Kobe Steel and Furukawa Aluminum acquired the technology, invested
in special equipment for processing it, and began deliveries in 1984. See
Kuno and Rubin, op.cit.
55. The USAF/Fairchild T-46 jet trainer, the American counterpart of the
XT-4, ran into such cost, schedule and quality problems that the USAF
cancelled it.
56. Wall Street Journal, 23 April 1986. As noted above, KHI was the prime
contractor on this project.
57. Danforth quoted in the Wall Street Journal 16 March 1987, and 12
October 1987. The corporate headquarters of the two US firms that competed
to supply the FSX are in St Louis. McDonnell Douglas is one of Missouri's
largest employers, while General Dynamics' production facilities are located
in Fort Worth, Texas. McDonnell Douglas was heavily favored to win the
competition: the Japanese had always insisted that the FS-X, which will spend
much of its time over water, have two engines, and both of MD's candidates
(the F-15 and F-18) do. GD's F-16 does not, and GD discouraged a such a
maj or modification.
A team of engineers visited the US shortly before the decision and
returned to Japan endorsing the F-15, but their advice was ignored; the F-16
was selected in a last minute reversal. The official reason given was cost,
but the F-15 was already in production at MHI, the strong yen made all US
fighters a relative bargain, and cost has never been a primary consideration
in Japanese procurement strategy. One reason may be that the fly-by-wire
F-16 offered more opportunities to learn than the F-15 and was more amenable
to extensive modification; by these criteria, however, the fly-by-wire F-18
was the natural choice. A modification of this argument would be that
Japanese planners, having worked with MD on coproduction of the F-4 and F-15,
felt that they could learn more by switching partners. There has even been
speculation that the JDA's surprise move was influenced by a desire to punish
Danforth, sometimes known as "the senator from McDonnell Douglas," for the
heavy-handed pressure and outright threats he made prior to the decision.
58. "Nakasone cannot fight US on FSX development," Nihon Keizai Shimbum,
reprinted in Japan Economic Journal, 25 July 1987.
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59. Vociferous criticism of the arrangement in the Japanese press indicates
that the FS-X coalition may nave used the "humiliation factor" to rally
support for a tough stance in negotiations over program leadership. For
example, Keidanren Defense Production Committee Executive Director Morikawa
Hiroshi said at the time of the October agreement that "Now that our
original FS-X development plan has been completely abandoned, our concern is
how Japan can take the initiative in the joint project." Similarly, the
Nihon Keizai Shimbun editorialized that the US had "jeopardized Japanese
national sovereignty" and that "We hope that the Defense Agency will spare
no words in securing a leadership role to ensure that the program is as
fruitful for Japan as possible." (Both citations are from the Japan
Economic Journal 17 October 1987, p.2 7.) The Asahi Jaanaru (1 July 1988)
went even further in its story on the "US-Japan High Tech Air War," asking
if "Japanese industries, that have finally achieved their independence, can
escape from the evil influence of technonationalism that was born in Nazi
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